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INTERNATIONAL MYOPIA: HAMDAN'S SHORTCUT TO
'VICTORY"
Michael W. Lewis *
"Yes, but if we have such another victory, we are undone."
-Pyrrhus'
The Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld2 was
hailed by many as a victory for international law.3 Basing part of
its decision on the Geneva Conventions, the Court was seen as
forcing a reluctant administration to recognize and comply with
international law. However, a closer look at the opinion's Geneva
Conventions analysis would have called that conclusion into ques-
tion even before the legislative response that has placed interna-
tional law further outside the consideration of American courts.4
* Assistant Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University Claude W. Pettit College of
Law; B.A., 1986, John Hopkins University; J.D., 1998, Harvard Law School, cum laude.
This article evolved from lectures on the international law features of the Hamdan
opinion that I delivered at the UC Davis School of Law, the University of the Pacific
McGeorge School of Law, the University of Notre Dame Law School and the Ohio State
University Moritz College of Law and from my public debates on the subject with Dean
John Hutson of the Franklin Pierce Law Center and Professor Brad Roth of Wayne State
University Law School. I would like to thank Professor John Paul Jones of the University
of Richmond School of Law and Professor Bobby Chesney of the Wake Forest University
School of Law for their review of this article.
1. FRANCIS BACON, Apophthegms, in THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 107, 118 (Parry
& McMillan 1859) (Apophthegm 193).
2. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
3. See, e.g., Press Release, Amnesty Int'l, USA: Supreme Court's Ruling-A Victory
for Human Rights (June 29, 2006), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/eng
amr511012006; see also Jefferson Morley, World Opinion Roundup, Guantanamo Reax:
Court Ruling a Victory for U.S. Ideals, http://blog.washingtonpost.com/worldopinionround
up/2006/07/guantanamo reaction seen as us.html (July 5, 2006, 11:12 EST).
4. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 5(a), 120 Stat. 2600,
2631 (2006) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 note) (prohibiting the invocation of the Ge-
neva Conventions in any habeas proceeding or other civil action against the United States
or its officers in any court of the United States, its States, or territories); see also Boume-
diene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 986-87 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (finding that Congress's passage of
the Military Commissions Act ("MCA") clearly and affirmatively strips federal courts of
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Ignoring its own canons of treaty interpretation, expansively
reading new protections into the Convention, and employing in-
flammatory and inaccurate comparisons between current U.S.
conduct and that of the Japanese during World War II, the Court
may have contributed to the legislative (over)reaction and added
further support to criticism that international law is actually no
more than policy by another name.
Captured in Afghanistan, Salim Hamdan is alleged to have
been Osama bin Laden's driver and bodyguard.5 He was charged
with a violation of the laws of war and was to be tried by a mili-
tary commission.' Hamdan filed a habeas corpus petition chal-
lenging his detention and the validity of the military commis-
sion.7 Hamdan won at the district court level, lost in the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, and thus brought to the Supreme
Court a whole host of issues including his contention that the
commission's procedures violated international law.' The Su-
preme Court, through Justice Stevens, upheld Hamdan's chal-
lenge on several grounds.9 On the international law issues, the
Court declared that Hamdan was entitled to protection under the
Geneva Conventions and that the military commission's proce-
dures violated basic rights guaranteed by those Conventions. 0
Because of international law's disaggregated and diffuse na-
ture, it develops as often through national courts' opinions as it
does through the pronouncements of international or regional
bodies, such as the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") or the
European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR")." As a result, any
opinion rendered by a nation's high court can influence the inter-
national understanding of treaty obligations or the scope of cus-
habeas corpus jurisdiction over Guantanamo detainees); Zalita v. Bush, No. 05-1220, slip
op. at 1 (D.D.C. Apr. 19, 2007).
5. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2761 (2006).
6. See id. at 2760-61.
7. Id. at 2759
8. See id. at 2761-62.
9. See id. at 2786, 2798.
10. See id. at 2798.
11. While the ECHR handles an ever increasing docket, the ICJ, and the fledgling In-
ternational Criminal Court ("ICC"), produce only a handful of opinions each year. List of
Cases, International Court of Justice, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?pl=3&p2=2
(last visited Nov. 26, 2007); Hearing Schedule and Transcripts, International Criminal
Court, http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases/Hearing-Schedule/.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2007). At
the time of publication, the ICJ has 12 cases pending. Pending Cases, International Court
of Justice, http://www.icj-cij.org/docketlindex.php?pl=3&p2=1 (last visited Nov. 26, 2007).
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tomary international law. The Supreme Court of the United
States has generally respected its role in international law by
providing exceptionally thorough analyses when international
law issues are involved.' 2 In departing from this traditional ap-
proach, the Hamdan Court gave an incomplete and at times cur-
sory analysis of critical issues involving the Geneva Conventions'
scope and the substantive protections the Conventions provide.
This analytical failure assured that questions about the Geneva
Conventions' scope and substance would resurface, as they have
done in the recent Fourth Circuit opinion of Al-Marri v. Wright, a
case that is destined to require the Court to revisit these issues. 3
Part I of this article will look at how the Supreme Court of the
United States historically has dealt with international law issues,
and specifically how it interprets international treaties. Part II
will describe the relevant portions of the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions, particularly Common Articles 2 and 3, the 1977 Additional
Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, and the Conventions'
Commentaries. Part III will review the portion of the Court's
Hamdan opinion that interprets the scope and application of the
Geneva Conventions. Part IV will describe how a more tradition-
ally thorough approach to international treaty interpretation
would have changed the contours of the opinion and what the im-
plications of those changes would have been for international law.
I. INTERPRETING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AMERICAN COURTS
American courts were dealing with issues of international law
before the federal judiciary was even created. 14 Although jurists
12. See generally, El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 (1999);
E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v.
Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988); Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985); The Paquete Ha-
bana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820); Ware v.
Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796); see also United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S.
655 (1992) (providing a thorough analysis of the international law issue, but concluding
there was no violation of the extradiction treaty between the United States and Mexico).
13. See 487 F.3d 160, 184-86 (4th Cir. 2007).
14. See, e.g., Respublica v. de Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111 (1784). The Court of
Oyer and Terminer in Philadelphia was asked to determine whether an affront suffered by
the secretary to the French ambassador at the hands of a French citizen on American soil
was a violation of the law of nations and, based upon that determination, what entity
should be empowered to pass sentence on the defendant for his conduct. See id. at 115.
The international relations implications of this case were a cause of grave concern for
Thomas Jefferson who commented on the need for swift action in this matter in a letter to
2008]
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over the years have disagreed on the influence that international
law should have on American constitutional interpretation, they
have almost uniformly approached the task of interpreting inter-
national law with a procedural and historical thoroughness that
at times exceeds that afforded to questions of domestic law.'5 In
contrast, one of the most striking features of Hamdan's treatment
of the Geneva Conventions is its brevity. While brevity itself is no
vice and prolixity no virtue, Justice Stevens's discussion of the
Geneva Conventions represents a significant departure from the
much more detailed approaches taken by other Justices, from
Gray'" to Ginsburg,' 7 when examining issues of international
law.
In United States v. Smith, Justice Story produced perhaps the
longest footnote in Supreme Court history to catalog the myriad
of sources consulted to determine how international law defined
piracy." The footnote on page 163 of the opinion covers eighteen
pages and lists over twenty-five commentaries, court opinions,
statutory interpretations and descriptions of state practice in-
cluding that of England, Scotland, France, Italy and Spain, all of
which Justice Story consulted and summarized in order to sup-
port the Supreme Court's certification to the circuit court that
Smith's actions were piracy as defined by the law of nations. 19
Eighty years later in the celebrated case of The Paquete Ha-
bana, the Court, through Justice Gray, stated that "[i]nterna-
tional law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and admin-
istered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction .... For
this purpose ... resort must be had to the customs and usages of
civilized nations."2" In determining the law of nations with re-
spect to the capture and condemnation of fishing vessels during
wartime, Justice Gray's analysis spanned over twenty pages and
considered wartime naval practices, commentaries and treatises,
James Madison. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (May 25, 1784), in 4
THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 363, 364-65 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1904).
15. This is true particularly with regard to treaty interpretation. See Air France, 470
U.S. 392 (1985); see also Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49 (1963).
16. See generally, The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (Justice Gray).
17. See generally, El Al Israel, 525 U.S. 155 (Justice Ginsburg).
18. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 163 n. a (1820).
19. Id.
20. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
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foreign and domestic prize court rulings, and historical and con-
temporary treaties.21
Justice Gray began with a historical review of the fifteenth cen-
tury conflicts between England and France, and sixteenth cen-
tury conflicts between France and the Holy Roman Empire and
between France and Holland.2 2 Justice Gray also discussed the
seventeenth century French commentary "Us et Coutumes de la
Mer," which outlines a custom that prevailed during the subse-
quent war between France and Holland in the seventeenth cen-
tury.23 In describing eighteenth century state practice towards
coastal fishing vessels, Justice Gray turned to U.S. and French
conduct during the American Revolution, to treaties that the
United States entered into with Prussia on the subject, and to
English high court decisions discussing fishing vessels' prize
status during the war between England, France and Holland.24
His treatment of nineteenth century developments was equally
extensive, analyzing naval conduct during the Mexican-American
War (1846), the Crimean War (1854), the Franco-Prussian War
(1870), and the Sino-Japanese War (1894).25 Upon completing
this historical review of relevant naval conduct during conflict,
Justice Gray also felt compelled to complete a thorough review of
treatises and commentaries discussing coastal fishing vessels'
prize status.26 This included commentaries from British, French,
Dutch, Spanish, Argentine, German, Austrian, and Italian writ-
ers that Justice Gray viewed as "too important to be passed by
without notice."27
In addition to the detailed description of material supporting
his conclusion, Justice Gray explicitly addressed examples of con-
trary naval conduct that ignored the customary treatment af-
forded coastal fishing vessels, and he evaluated the weight that
those exceptional actions should carry when articulating the
reach of international custom. 2 He found that the French actions
in 1793 against English fisherman and the English actions dur-
21. Id. at 687-710.
22. Id. at 687-88.
23. Id. at 688-89.
24. Id. at 689-94.
25. Id. at 695-700.
26. See id. at 701-08.
27. Id. at 706.
28. See id. at 691-96, 699-700.
2008]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
ing the Crimean War against Russian fishing vessels were both
subsequently corrected by the respective nations and that these
exceptions did not undermine his finding that customary interna-
tional law protected coastal fisherman.29
It might be argued that the extensive reviews of treatises,
commentaries, and historical state practices found in The Paquete
Habana and United States v. Smith were either creatures of a dif-
ferent time or were dictated by the difficulties inherent in defin-
ing nebulous concepts such as "the law of nations" and customary
international law, a task that the Court did not necessarily have
to contend with in Hamdan. However, recent cases involving in-
ternational treaty interpretation, other than Hamdan, exhibit
characteristically broad and deep consultation of sources.3 °
Justice O'Connor, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, in
Air France v. Saks articulated the standard for international
treaty interpretation when she declared that it is the Court's "re-
sponsibility to give the specific words of the treaty a meaning
consistent with the shared expectations of the contracting par-
ties."3 ' In Air France, the Supreme Court was asked to define the
term "accident" as used by the Warsaw Convention 2 to decide if
it encompassed injuries to airline passengers that resulted from
normal aircraft operations.3 3 This required the Court to deter-
mine the contemporary French legal meaning of the term "acci-
dent" because the "Warsaw Convention was drafted in French by
continental jurists."34 Much like Justice Story and Justice Gray
before her, Justice O'Connor's analysis spanned eleven pages in
explaining what the term "accident" meant as it appeared in the
Warsaw Convention.35 She reviewed the text of the treaty,36 its
29. See id.
30. See, e.g., El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 (1999) (inter-
preting the Warsaw Convention); Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985) (also analyzing
and applying the Warsaw Convention).
31. Air France, 470 U.S. at 399 (Justice Powell took no part in the decision).
32. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Trans-
portation by Air art. 17, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 3018, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter
Warsaw Convention].
33. See Air France, 470 U.S. at 396.
34. Id. at 399 (citing Andrew F. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States
and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497,498-500 (1967)).
35. See id. at 397-407.
36. Id. at 397-98.
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commentaries and minutes,37 the rejected proposals of various
delegations to the conference,38 judicial decisions from England
and France, 39 as well as the discussions and negotiations from the
Guatemala City and Montreal Protocols that subsequently modi-
fied the Warsaw Convention.4 °
Other cases interpreting the Warsaw Convention received simi-
larly thorough treatment from Justices Marshall and Ginsburg.
In Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, Justice Marshall spent eighteen
pages determining whether the phrase "lesion corporelle" allowed
compensation for mental or psychic injuries unaccompanied by
physical injuries.41 Just as Justice O'Connor did in Air France,
Justice Marshall, also writing for a unanimous Court, consulted
contemporary French legal dictionaries," legislative histories,"
court opinions,44 treatises, 45 the minutes of the Convention 46 and
the subsequent protocols from the Hague, Guatemala City, and
Montreal Conventions.47 In addition to accurately defining l6sion
corporelle, Justice Marshall distinguished an Israeli court's opin-
ion on the scope of Article 17,48 reviewed the German, Austrian,
and Swiss translations from the original French,49 and contrasted
the language of the Warsaw Convention with the clear language
employed by the Berne Convention on International Rail, which
explicitly allows recovery for purely psychic injuries.5 °
Similarly, in El Al Israel Airlines v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, Justice
Ginsburg devoted ten pages to determining whether the exclusiv-
ity provisions of Article 24 of the Warsaw Convention precluded
Tseng from bringing a personal injury action under local law.51
37. See id. at 400-03.
38. See id. at 402.
39. Id. at 400.
40. Id. at 403-04.
41. See E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 533, 535-52 (1991).
42. Id. at 536.
43. See id. at 542-43.
44. Id. at 538-39.
45. Id. at 539.
46. Id. at 544.
47. Id. at 547-50.
48. Id. at 550-52.
49. Id. at 541.
50. Id. at 545 (citing International Convention Concerning the Carriage of Passengers
and Luggage by Rail art. 28, Oct. 25, 1952, 242 U.N.T.S. 355, 390).
51. See 525 U.S. 155, 160, 167-76 (1999).
2008]
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Justice Ginsburg, writing for eight, consulted the drafting history
of the Convention, including the minutes of the Warsaw Confer-
ence that outlined the proposals of various delegations.52 She also
considered an opinion from the British House of Lords interpret-
ing the reach of the Czechoslovak delegation's proposal that the
circuit court relied on in determining the scope of Article 24,"
and the effect of Article 24's amendment by the Montreal Proto-
col.54 Additionally, Justice Ginsburg discussed at length the pri-
mary and "complementary" purposes of the Convention to prop-
erly understand the balance struck by the drafters between the
competing interests underlying the Warsaw Conference.55 This
understanding appropriately informed Justice Ginsburg's ulti-
mate interpretation of Article 24's exclusivity provisions.
These treaty interpretation standards are not limited to cases
involving the Warsaw Convention. In Volkswagenwerk Aktienge-
sellschaft v. Schlunk, Justice O'Connor again applied the Air
France standard for treaty interpretation when determining the
scope of Article 1 of the Hague Service Convention, which deals
with international service of process.56 She reviewed the Conven-
tion's negotiating history to determine whether the terms "notifi-
cation" and "signification" were intended to carry the same mean-
ing as the United States' definition of service of process.57 She
also consulted the proposals of the German, French and Yugoslav
delegations to determine whether the Convention envisaged reli-
ance on the law of the forum state to determine the effectiveness
of service abroad." Additionally, while canvassing the service ve-
hicles employed by various nations at the time of the Convention,
Justice O'Connor acknowledged the importance attached to the
Convention's stated objectives.59
The Supreme Court traditionally displays a very broad and
deep consideration of sources when interpreting both customary
52. See id. at 159, 172-73.
53. Id. at 173-74 (citing Sidhu v. British Airways [1997] 1 All E.R. 193).
54. Id. at 174-75.
55. Id. at 169-71.
56. 486 U.S. 694, 699-700 (1988).
57. See id. at 700-01.
58. See id. at 701-02.
59. See id. at 702-04 (noting that the conference intended to eliminate the use of noti-
fication au parquet practiced by France, the Netherlands, Greece, Belgium, and Italy at




international law and international treaties. Specifically, when
the Court interprets treaties that present ambiguities or uncer-
tainties, it routinely has gone beyond the text of the treaties to
consider supplemental agreements, state practice, the prepara-
tory work and negotiating history of the treaties, and broader
rules of customary international law that might be relevant to de-
fining the treaties' terms. This is not only the Court's traditional
practice, but it is also a practice that follows the guidelines for
treaty interpretation established by the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties.60
II. THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS
With the recent accessions of the Republic of Nauru and the
newly formed Republic of Montenegro, the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions became the only international treaty to achieve universal
acceptance.61 Drafted after World War II, the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions greatly expanded the protections previously afforded by
the 1929 Geneva Convention. 2 In turn, the 1929 Convention was
itself a compilation and expansion of the protections provided to
prisoners of war by the 1899 and 1907 Hague Regulations and
other special agreements entered into by the belligerents during
World War 1.63 The 1929 Geneva Convention focused almost ex-
clusively on the treatment of prisoners of war with but a single
article, Article 17, devoted to the treatment of certain classes of
civilians traveling with the armed forces.64 To remedy this, the
1949 drafters created four separate conventions, each designed to
protect a different group: the sick and wounded on land; the sick,
wounded, and shipwrecked at sea; prisoners of war; and civil-
60. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 31-33, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 340, 8 I.L.M. 679, 691-93.
61. See Press Release, Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Geneva Conventions of 1949
Achieve Universal Acceptance (Aug. 21, 2006), available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/
siteengO.nsf/ html/geneva-conventions-news-210806.
62. See The ICRC Since 1945: The Geneva Conventions of 1949, Int'l Comm. of the
Red Cross, http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteengO.nsf/htmlall/icrc-genevaconventions-revi
sion-1949 (last visited Nov. 26, 2007).
63. See Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, 27 July
1929-Introduction, Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/
305?OpenDocument (last visited Nov. 26, 2007).
64. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armies in the Field art. 17, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2074, 2088, 118 L.N.T.S. 303,
323.
20081
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ians.6' The first three articles of all four Conventions are identical
and are therefore known as Common Articles 1, 2, and 3.66
In 1977, Additional Protocols I and II were added to the 1949
Geneva Conventions.17 These protocols further expanded the pro-
tections afforded to all four categories covered by the 1949 Con-
ventions and, perhaps surprisingly, were the first international
agreements to specifically forbid the targeting of civilians.68
While these Additional Protocols have gained wide acceptance,
they have not approached the universal acceptance of the 1949
Geneva Conventions. 9 That said, nations that have refused to
sign or ratify the Additional Protocols because of reservations re-
garding certain provisions, recognize much of their content as a
statement of customary international law. 70
65. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinaf-
ter Geneva I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva III];
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva IV].
66. See Geneva I, supra note 65, 6 U.S.T. at 3116-18, 75 U.N.T.S. at 32-34; Geneva
II, supra note 65, 6 U.S.T. at 3220-22, 75 U.N.T.S. at 86-88; Geneva III, supra note 65, 6
U.S.T. at 3318-20, 75 U.N.T.S. at 136-38; Geneva IV, supra note 65, 6 U.S.T. at 3518-20,
75 U.N.T.S. at 288-90.
67. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3,
16 I.L.M. 1391, [hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 16 I.L.M. 1442 [hereinafter Protocol II].
68. See Protocol I, supra note 67, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26-27, 16 I.L.M. at 1413-14; Proto-
col II, supra note 67, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 615-16, 16 I.L.M. at 1447-48.
69. As of the publication of this article, 167 of 194 states are parties to Protocol I, and
163 states are parties to Protocol II. State Parties to the Following International Humani-
tarian Law and Other Related Treaties as of 22-Oct-2007, ICRC, www.icrc.org/IHL.
nsf/(SPF)/party-main-treaties/$file/IHL and other related treaties.pdf. The United
States has signed both Additional Protocols but neither has been ratified by the Senate.
David Glazier, Full and Fair by What Measure?: Identifying the International Law Regu-
lating Military Commission Procedure, 24 B.U. INT'L L.J. 55, 111 (2006). This is partially
due to executive disagreement with the provisions of Protocol I that provide greater pro-
tections to irregular armed groups than previously found in the Geneva Conventions. On
the other hand, the Senate has declined to give its advice and consent to Protocol II in
spite of two executive transmittals requesting consent to ratify or accede to the treaty. For
more on the ratification history of these treaties see Geoffrey Corn, Taking the Bitter with
the Sweet: A Law of War Based Analysis of the Military Commission, 35 STETSON L. REV.
811, 858-60, 871 (2006).
70. See generally Geoffrey S. Corn, Hamdan, Fundamental Fairness, and the Signifi-
cance of Additional Protocol 11, ARMY LAW., Aug. 2006, at 1 (discussing the extent to which
the United States recognizes the Additional Protocols as customary international law).
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It is the interplay between Common Articles 2 and 3, the sub-
stantive protections of Common Article 3, and the incorporation
of Article 75 of Protocol I into the protections provided by Com-
mon Article 3 that underlie the Court's opinion in Hamdan.
Historically, Common Article 2 can trace its roots back to Arti-
cle 2 of the Hague Convention of 1899, which applied the provi-
sions "in case of war."71 While the title of both the 1907 and 1929
Geneva Conventions made it clear that they were intended for
use during wartime, the changing nature of warfare and the in-
creasing frequency of undeclared wars persuaded the drafters
that a more explicit and expansive definition of warfare was re-
quired by 1949.72 Thus, Common Article 2 established the scope
of the four Conventions by stating:
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace-
time, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war
or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more
of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recog-
nized by one of them. 
73
Article 2 describes what, for want of a better term, might be
considered a "traditional war." Whether declared as a war or not,
the Geneva Conventions cover the conduct of all parties to any
armed conflict between States. Therefore, all of the Conventions'
protections apply to any such armed conflict and are binding on
the armed forces-however constituted-of all parties to the con-
flict.
71. See JEAN DE PREUX ET AL., COMMENTARY: III GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO
THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 19 (Jean S. Pictet ed., A.P. de Heney trans., 1960)
[hereinafter GENEVA III COMMENTARY]. There are two significant sources for the drafting
history of the Geneva Conventions: the three volume Final Record of the Diplomatic Con-
ference of Geneva of 1949, and the Commentaries, which were produced by a number of
attendees and edited by Jean Pictet, who was appointed Director of the International
Committee of the Red Cross in 1946 and took charge of the preparatory work that led to
the adoption of the 1949 Conventions. 1-3 FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC
CONFERENCE OF GENEVA OF 1949 (William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 2004) [hereinafter FINAL
RECORD]. While the Commentaries are not considered "official" interpretations, they are
designed to make the principles underlying the Conventions more accessible. This is done
by organizing the discussion and the development of the Conventions on an article-by-
article basis rather than chronologically listing the events of the conference as done by the
Final Record. This article cites to the more readable text of the Commentaries, but many
of the footnotes will contain references to the Final Record to reflect the nations taking the
positions discussed in the Commentaries.
72. See GENEVA III COMMENTARY, supra note 71, at 19.
73. Geneva I, supra note 65, 6 U.S.T. at 3116, 75 U.N.T.S. at 32; Geneva II, supra
note 65, 6 U.S.T. at 3220, 75 U.N.T.S. at 86; Geneva III, supra note 65, 6 U.S.T. at 3318,
75 U.N.T.S. at 136; Geneva IV, supra note 65, 6 U.S.T. at 3518, 75 U.N.T.S. at 288.
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Although the concept of applying the Geneva Conventions' es-
sential principles to non-international conflicts, such as civil
wars, was first discussed at the 1938 London International Red
Cross Conference, Common Article 3 was a creation of the 1949
Conventions. 4 It began as the French delegation's proposal for a
preamble to Geneva Convention IV relative to the Protection of
Civilians in Time of War. 7 Ultimately, the inability to arrive at a
unanimously accepted preamble prevented its adoption in that
form.76 Before reaching this impasse, however, the French dele-
gation drew on an earlier Italian suggestion and attempted to set-
tle the intense debate about applying the Geneva Conventions'
principles to civil wars by proposing that all non-international
conflicts should be subject to the provisions of the preamble to
Geneva IV.77 Once the decision was reached to eliminate the pre-
amble, a modified version of the proposed preamble received a
clear majority of votes for inclusion as Common Article 3. 78 Com-
mon Article 3 provides:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character oc-
curring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each
Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the fol-
lowing provisions:
(I) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and
those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or
any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated hu-
manely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, col-
our, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar
criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohib-
ited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to
the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humili-
ating and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of exe-
cutions without previous judgment pronounced by a regu-
74. See GENEVA III COMMENTARY, supra note 71, at 29-30.
75. Id. at 14.
76. Id. at 16; see also 2 FINAL RECORD, supra note 71, at 561.
77. GENEVA III COMMENTARY, supra note 71, at 33.
78. Id. at 34.
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larly constituted court, affording all the judicial guaran-
tees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples....
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the
legal status of the Parties to the conflict. 
79
Common Article 3 has been referred to as a "Convention in
miniature" because as a single, stand-alone article, it provides
certain baseline protections to individuals involved in non-
international conflicts.8 0 The stated purpose of this Article was to
expand the Geneva Conventions' underlying "principle of respect
for human personality" to "aid the victims of civil wars and inter-
nal conflicts."8 "
III. THE HAMDAN OPINION
The Hamdan opinion is long, wide-ranging, and complex. It
deals with separation of powers issues, the limits of both execu-
tive and legislative power, the scope of habeas corpus rights, and
questions of legislative intent respecting retroactivity. 2 It briefly
examines judicial abstention 3 and also addresses the United
States' internal criminal procedures related to the laws of war. 4
Additionally, it examines the extent to which the Uniform Code of
Military Justice ("UCMJ") provides the definitive boundaries for
these procedures when applied to both American citizens and
79. Geneva I, supra note 65, 6 U.S.T. at 3117-18, 75 U.N.T.S. at 32-34; Geneva II,
supra note 65, 6 U.S.T. at 3220-22, 75 U.N.T.S. at 86-88; Geneva III, supra note 65, 6
U.S.T. at 3318-20, 75 U.N.T.S. at 136-38; Geneva IV, supra note 65, 6 U.S.T. at 3518-20,
75 U.N.T.S. at 288-90.
80. GENEVA III COMMENTARY, supra note 71, at 34; 2 FINAL RECORD, supra note 71, at
326. The delegation from the Soviet Union used this term somewhat derisively, implying
that the protections offered by Common Article 3 to non-international conflicts paled in
comparison to those offered by the Geneva Conventions as a whole to international con-
flicts. See 2 FINAL RECORD, supra note 71, at 326.
81. GENEVA III COMMENTARY, supra note 71, at 28; see also 2 FINAL RECORD, supra
note 71, at 40-43 (containing one example of the discussions concerning applicability to
civil wars).
82. See generally Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
83. See id. at 2769-72.
84. See id. at 2775-86.
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aliens.8 5 Lastly, and perhaps most enduringly, it interprets the
scope and substance of Common Article 3.6
Justice Stevens answered three fundamental questions about
Common Article 3. First, he determined the scope of Common Ar-
ticle 3 relative to Common Article 2 by defining the term "conflict
not of an international character.""7 Second, he determined that
the military commissions, as constituted, could not be considered
a "regularly constituted court" as that term is used in subpara-
graph (1)(d) of Common Article 3." Finally, Justice Stevens, now
writing for a plurality of four, decided that the military commis-
sions did not afford "'all the judicial guarantees which are recog-
nized as indispensable by civilized peoples."'8 9
A. The Scope of Common Articles 2 and 3
The threshold question for this portion of the opinion is
whether the Geneva Conventions apply to the conflict between al
Qaeda and the United States, and if so, which specific provisions
apply.9 ° The Court claimed to have postponed a merits decision of
the Government's argument that the conflict is outside the scope
of Common Article 2.91 It based this postponement on its finding
that the conflict is covered by Common Article 3 and that the
military commissions failed to provide the protections mandated
by that Article.92 In arriving at this conclusion, the Court exam-
ined the scope of both Articles.93 As noted above, Common Article
2 applies "to all cases of declared war or of any other armed con-
flict which may arise between two or more of the High Contract-
85. See id. at 2786-93.
86. See id. at 2795-98.
87. See id. at 2795-96.
88. See id. at 2796-97 (citing Common Article 3, subparagraph 1(d), Geneva I, supra
note 65, 6 U.S.T. at 3118, 75 U.N.T.S. at 34; Geneva II, supra note 65, 6 U.S.T at 3222, 75
U.N.T.S. at 88; Geneva III, supra note 65, 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138; Geneva IV,
supra note 65, 6 U.S.T. at 3520, 75 U.N.T.S. at 290).
89. See id. at 2797-98 (quoting Common Article 3, Geneva I, supra note 65, 6 U.S.T.
at 3118, 75 U.N.T.S. at 84; Geneva II, supra note 65, 6 U.S.T. at 3222, 75 U.N.T.S. at 88;
Geneva III, supra note 65, 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138; Geneva IV, supra note 65,
6 U.S.T. at 3520, 75 U.N.T.S. at 290).
90. See id. at 2793-95.
91. See id. at 2795.
92. See id. at 2795-98.
93. See id. at 2795-96.
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ing Parties,"94 while Common Article 3 concerns "armed conflict
not of an international character occurring in the territory of one
of the High Contracting Parties."95 The Court concluded that
while Common Article 2 applies to clashes between nations,
Common Article 3's application to "conflict[s] not of an interna-
tional character" acts as a point of "contradistinction to a conflict
between nations."96 Adopting the reasoning of Judge Williams's
concurrence in the court below,97 the Court found that the term
"international" bears its literal meaning in this context and there-
fore Common Article 3 applies to all armed conflicts not covered
by Common Article 2.9" This finding, and the Court's subsequent
application of Common Article 3 protections to Hamdan,99 effec-
tively foreclosed any revisitation of the Common Article 2 ques-
tion on which the Court purportedly "postponed" consideration. 00
After acknowledging that the discussion of Common Article 3
in the Commentaries to the Geneva Conventions focuses primar-
ily on the protection of rebels in internal conflicts and civil wars,
the Court relied on a general statement from the Commentaries
"that the scope of the Article must be as wide as possible" and on
the fact that language limiting Common Article 3 to civil wars, co-
lonial conflicts, or wars of religion was omitted from the final ver-
sion. 101 In the following footnote, the Court further supported this
interpretation with a second reference to the Commentaries on
Common Article 3, a reference to the Commentaries on Geneva
IV dealing with the protection of civilians, a quote from the De-
partment of the Army's Law of War Handbook, and a statement
by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugosla-
via ("ICTY") that the 'character of the conflict is irrelevant"'
when determining the scope of Common Article 312 Based on
94. Geneva I, supra note 65, 6 U.S.T. at 3116, 75 U.N.T.S. at 32; Geneva II, supra
note 65, 6 U.S.T. at 3220, 75 U.N.T.S. at 86; Geneva III, supra note 65, 6 U.S.T. at 3318,
75 U.N.T.S. at 136; Geneva IV, supra note 65, 6 U.S.T. at 3518, 75 U.N.T.S. at 288.
95. Geneva I, supra note 65, 6 U.S.T. at 3116, 75 U.N.T.S. at 32; Geneva II, supra
note 65, 6 U.S.T. at 3220, 75 U.N.T.S. at 86; Geneva III, supra note 65, 6 U.T.S. at 3318,
75 U.N.T.S. at 136, Geneva IV, supra note 65, 6 U.S.T. at 3518, 75 U.N.T.S. at 288.
96. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2795.
97. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 44 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Williams, J. concur-
ring).
98. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2796.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 2795.
101. Id. at 2796 (citing GENEVA III COMMENTARY, supra note 71, at 36-37, 42-43).
102. Id. at 2796 n.63 (quoting Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the
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these authorities the Court found that Hamdan must be afforded
the protections provided by Common Article 3103 After making
this determination, the Court then set about determining what
those protections are. 104
B. Regularly Constituted Courts
The Court first examined the requirement that Common Arti-
cle 3 defendants must be tried by a 'regularly constituted court
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as in-
dispensable by civilized peoples.""'1 5 Because the requirement is
not further defined in either Common Article 3 or its Commen-
tary, the Court relied on a definition of regularly constituted tri-
bunals found in the Commentary to Article 66 of the Fourth Ge-
neva Convention and an International Committee of the Red
Cross ("ICRC") treatise on customary international law. 116 The
Geneva Convention Commentary states that "ordinary military
courts of the Occupying Power" fulfill the requirement for a court
to be considered regularly constituted,o7 thereby supporting the
Court's conclusion that the military commissions must be con-
ducted in accordance with the UCMJ. The ICRC Treatise states
that a regularly constituted court is one that is "established and
organised in accordance with the laws and procedures already in
force in a country." '
Without examining the underlying context for either of these
definitions, the Court found that the military commissions' fail-
ure to conform to them means that the commissions are not
"regularly constituted" as that term is used in Common Article
Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction 102 (Oct. 2, 1995)).
103. Id. at 2796.
104. See id. at 2796-98.
105. See id. (quoting Common Article 3, Geneva I, supra note 65, 6 U.S.T. at 3118, 75
U.N.T.S. at 34; Geneva II, supra note 65, 6 U.S.T. at 3222, 75 U.N.T.S. at 88; Geneva III,
supra note 65, 6 U.T.S. at 3322, 75 U.N.T.S. at 136, Geneva IV, supra note 65, 6 U.S.T. at
3520, 75 U.N.T.S. at 290).
106. See id. at 2796-97.
107. OSCAR M. UHLER ET AL., COMMENTARY: IV GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE
PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 340 (Jean S. Pictet ed., Ronald Griffon
& C.W. Dumbeton trans., 1958) [hereinafter GENEVA IV COMMENTARY].
108. 1 INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL




3109 Before moving on to address indispensable judicial guaran-
tees, however, Justice Stevens paused to note that the Govern-
ment only provided a "cursory defense of Hamdan's military
commission in light of Common Article 3. "110 Whether Justice
Stevens did this to explain his own abbreviated treatment of the
issue, or merely as further support for Justice Kennedy's concur-
ring opinion, is unclear. In the extensive briefing undertaken by
the parties in this case, the respondent devoted only a single
paragraph of their brief and the petitioner devoted no more than
a few pages of his brief to the issue of regularly constituted
courts, with neither addressing the scope of Common Article 3's
requirement for "judicial guarantees." '
C. Indispensable Judicial Guarantees
The final Geneva Conventions issue that Justice Stevens ad-
dressed was whether the military commissions provide all the ju-
dicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civi-
lized peoples." 2 Because the indispensable judicial guarantees
are not enumerated in Common Article 3, Justice Stevens incor-
porated the "barest of those trial protections that have been rec-
ognized by customary international law" into Common Article
3.113 He concluded that Article 75 of Additional Protocol I properly
enumerates these barest of trial protections."' Although the
109. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2797.
110. Id.
111. See Brief for the Respondents at 49-50, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (No. 05-184)
[hereinafter Brief for the Respondents]; Brief for the Petitioner at 48-50, Hamdan, 126 S.
Ct. 2749 (No. 05-184) [hereinafter Brief for the Petitioner]. Additionally, neither party at-
tempted to define the scope of these protections in their briefs to the D.C. Circuit either.
Brief for Appellee at 48-49, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (No. 04-
5393); Reply Brief for Appellants at 22, Hamdan, 415 F.3d 33 (No. 04-5393).
112. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2797. Having found in his concurrence that the military com-
missions were not regularly constituted, Justice Kennedy found it unnecessary to reach
the question of indispensable judicial guarantees and declined to join Justice Stevens's
plurality opinion on that issue. See id. at 2799-2800 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 2797 (majority opinion).
114. Id. The relevant paragraph is Protocol I, Article 75, paragraph 4 which provides
the following:
No sentence may be passed and no penalty may be executed on a person
found guilty of a penal offence related to the armed conflict except pursuant
to a conviction pronounced by an impartial and regularly constituted court
respecting the generally recognized principles of regular judicial procedure,
which include the following:
(a) The procedure shall provide for an accused to be informed without
delay of the particulars of the offence alleged against him and shall af-
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United States has not ratified Protocol I, Justice Stevens pointed
out that the United States' objections were not to Article 75, and
moreover, that the United States has recognized these provisions
of Article 75 as being declarative of customary international
law.'15 Justice Stevens quoted subparagraph 4(e) of Article 75,
which provides for the right to be tried in one's presence, but his
analysis and supporting opinions dealt more with a defendant's
right to be heard, be apprised of the evidence against him, and to
cross examine witnesses providing that evidence.' 16
In support of the proposition that the right to be present is a
fundamental common law right recognized by American constitu-
tional law, Justice Stevens cited several domestic cases." 7 Craw-
ford v. Washington specifically deals with the Sixth Amendment
ford the accused before and during his trial all necessary rights and
means of defence;
(b) No one shall be convicted of an offence except on the basis of indi-
vidual penal responsibility;
(c) No one shall be accused or convicted of a criminal offence on account
of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under
the national or international law to which he was subject at the time
when it was committed; nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than
that which was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was
committed; if, after the commission of the offence, provision is made by
law for the imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit
thereby;
(d) Anyone charged with an offence is presumed innocent until proved
guilty according to law;
(e) Anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to be tried in
his presence;
(f) No one shall be compelled to testify against himself or to confess
guilt;
(g) Anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to examine, or
have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the atten-
dance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same con-
ditions as witnesses against him;
(h) No one shall be prosecuted or punished by the same Party for an of-
fence in respect of which a final judgement acquitting or convicting
that person has been previously pronounced under the same law and
judicial procedure;
(i) Anyone prosecuted for an offence shall have the right to have the
judgement pronounced publicly; and
(j) A convicted person shall be advised on conviction of his judicial and
other remedies and of the time-limits within which they may be exer-
cised.
Protocol I, supra note 67, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 37-38, 16 I.L.M. at 1424.
115. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2797 (quoting William H. Taft, IV, The Law of Armed Con-
flict After 9 / 11: Some Salient Features, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 319, 322 (2003)).
116. See id. at 2797-2798 & nn.66-67.
117. See id. at 2798 n.67.
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right to confrontation and cross examination of witnesses.118 The
second cited case, Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v.
McGrath, is actually based on a challenge to an administrative
determination that certain groups should be placed on watch lists
without their knowledge or opportunity to oppose such a deter-
mination.119 Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in that case fo-
cused on the defendant's right to be heard, not his right to be pre-
sent.12 ° In Diaz v. United States, a defendant's absence for a
portion of trial did not constitutionally undermine his conviction,
although in reaching that decision the court reaffirmed the im-
portance of a defendant's presence at trial.'21 Lastly, the Court in
Lewis v. United States found that the defendant had a right to
view the entire jury panel before exercising his preemptive
strikes. 122
These cases address American due process requirements, or
perhaps more broadly speaking, common law due process re-
quirements. While their value in furthering the Court's under-
standing of Common Article 3's requirements may be questioned,
they do indicate which protections Justice Stevens is most con-
cerned about providing. It is the right of confrontation-the right
to confront and cross examine witnesses and evidence against the
defendant-rather than the defendant's right merely to be pre-
sent. This guarantee of the right to cross examine opposing wit-
nesses is found in subparagraph 4(g) of Article 75.123
D. Summary
As described above, the Court has traditionally displayed con-
siderable thoroughness when deciding issues of international law.
Justice Story spent eighteen pages defining the term "piracy" in
United States v. Smith;124 Justice Gray spent over twenty pages
determining how the law of nations treated captured fishing ves-
sels in The Paquete Habana;.2 Justice O'Connor spent eleven
118. See generally 541 U.S. 36, 38 (2004).
119. See generally 341 U.S. 123, 124-25 (1951).
120. See id. at 168 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
121. See 223 U.S. 442, 453-59 (1912).
122. See 146 U.S. 370, 372-76 (1892).
123. Protocol I, supra note 67, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 38, 16 I.L.M. at 1424.
124. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 163 n.a (1820); see supra notes 18-19 and accompanying
text.
125. 175 U.S. 677, 687-710 (1900); see supra notes 20-29 and accompanying text.
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pages defining the term "accident" in Air France;126 and Justice
Marshall spent seventeen pages defining the term "lesion cor-
porelle" in Eastern Airlines v. Floyd.'27 In contrast, the Hamdan
Court defined armed "conflict not of an international character,"
determined the requirements of a regularly constituted court, and
decided what judicial guarantees are recognized as indispensable
by civilized peoples in just over five pages. 2 ' The Hamdan Court
arrived at its conclusions without significantly reviewing the
drafting history of Common Article 3 and the Additional Proto-
cols, or investigating any state practice outside of this country.'29
It did cite to an authoritative ICRC Treatise on customary inter-
national law, but it failed to provide any examination of the
sources used or the conclusions drawn by that treatise. 3 ° Addi-
tionally, the Court did not mention the Air France standard for
treaty interpretation that commends such an investigation.'
3'
This departure from the traditionally thorough consideration of
international treaty issues prevented an identification and analy-
sis of the competing purposes underlying the Geneva Conven-
tions. It also eschewed any examination of the sources used to de-
fine the substantive rights being granted. Both of these
oversights came at a price for international law.
IV. THE SCOPE OF COMMON ARTICLE 3-UNIVERSALITY
VERSUS ACCOUNTABILITY
This portion of the article explores whether the brevity of the
Hamdan Court's opinion on the Geneva Conventions issues sub-
stantively affected its outcome and how the analysis and results
might have been different.
Justice Stevens concluded that Hamdan was entitled to Com-
mon Article 3's protections because he found that the conflict be-
tween al Qaeda and the United States is a "conflict not of an in-
126. 470 U.S. 392, 397-407 (1985); see supra notes 31-40 and accompanying text.
127. 499 U.S. 530, 535-52; see supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
128. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2793-98. This is an estimated length in United States
Reporter pagination as that version of the opinion has not been published as of this publi-
cation.
129. See id.
130. Id. at 2796-97; see supra note 106 and accompanying text.
131. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2793-98.
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ternational character." 3 2 The very language of Common Article
3's first sentence invites exploration of the conflict's "character" to
determine its scope. 133 Yet, for the reasons described below, Jus-
tice Stevens was right to conclude that the "'character of the con-
flict is irrelevant' in deciding whether Common Article 3 ap-
plies."'34 However, because the drafting history shows that the
primary purpose of Common Article 3 was to extend humanitar-
ian law to internal conflicts and civil wars, commentators-and in
this case the Government135-continue to examine the nature of
the conflict when considering Common Article 3's application.
136
A more complete reading of the Geneva Conventions as a whole
and their accompanying Commentaries demonstrates that it is
not the nature of the conflict, but rather the nature of the com-
batant, or more specifically the combatant's organization that
should be considered when determining the scope of protections
provided by Common Article 3. This is particularly true if the
treaty is interpreted using the Air France standard, which re-
quires consideration of the "shared expectations of the contract-
ing parties" when determining the scope and meaning of a
treaty.
137
From the very beginning, there was a sharp disagreement
among the nations about whether international humanitarian
law should "interfere" with the conduct of internal conflicts.
138
While this debate was officially about the character of the con-
flict, the underlying discussion is actually based upon the charac-
132. Id. at 2795-96.
133. See Geneva I, supra note 65, 6 U.T.S. at 3116, 75 U.N.T.S. at 32; Geneva II, supra
note 65, 6 U.T.S. at 3220, 75 U.N.T.S. at 86; Geneva III, supra note 65, 6 U.T.S. at 3318,
75 U.N.T.S. at 136; Geneva IV, supra note 65, 6 U.T.S. at 3518, 75 U.N.T.S. at 288.
134. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2796 n.63 (quoting Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-
1, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 102 (Oct. 2,
1995)); see also GENEVA III COMMENTARY, supra note 71, at 35 (stating that the obser-
vance of Common Article 3 "does not depend upon preliminary discussions on the nature of
the conflict").
135. GENEVA III COMMENTARY, supra note 71, at 28; see also 2 FINAL RECORD, supra
note 71, at 40-43.
136. See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 111, at 48-49; see generally Corn, supra
note 69, at 836-61 (discussing the Article 2/3 paradigm for triggering law of war protec-
tions); Ved P. Nanda, Terrorism as an "Internal Conflict" Under the 1977 Geneva Protocol:
Defining "Enemy Combatant" and the International/Domestic Consequences, 14 MICH. ST.
J. INT'L L. 27, 30-33 (2006) (focusing on the gaps of the Geneva Conventions and the im-
plications of these gaps in relation to the United States war on terrorism).
137. See Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 399 (1985).
138. See GENEVA III COMMENTARY, supra note 71, at 28-29, 32.
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ter of the combatants.'39 The discussions revolved around the
threshold at which Common Article 3 would be found to apply,
and for many nations this threshold was based upon the cohe-
siveness of the rebel organization. 140 Those nations opposed to
adopting any form of Common Article 3 feared that "it would
cover all forms of insurrections, rebellion, and the break-up of
States, and even plain brigandage. Attempts to protect individu-
als might well prove to be at the expense of the equally legitimate
protection of the State."' 4 ' After making the familiar point that
one man's rebel is another man's freedom fighter, the nations
supporting adoption argued that:
[Tihe behaviour of the insurgents in the field would show whether
they were in fact mere felons, or, on the contrary, real combatants
who deserved to receive protection under the Conventions.... It was
not possible to talk of "terrorism," "anarchy" or "disorder" in the case
of rebels who complied with humanitarian principles. 1
42
The argument of those supporting adoption of Common Article
3 thus specifically disavows any intention of providing protections
for terrorists or anarchists. This makes it clear that the "shared
expectation of the parties" was that the protections of Common
Article 3 are earned, that some individuals fell outside those pro-
tections (however minimal), and that the limitation on those pro-
tections was based upon the character and conduct of the com-
batants themselves. This fundamental consideration was central
to the drafters of Common Article 3 and it was readily accessible
to the Hamdan Court, appearing only two pages before passages
139. See id. at 32-33.
140. See, e.g., 2 FINAL RECORD, supra note 71, at 331-32 (statements of the Danish and
Swiss delegations indicating that the scale of the conflict would determine when such pro-
tections would attach).
141. GENEVA III COMMENTARY, supra note 71, at 32; see also 2 FINAL RECORD, supra
note 71, at 46, 49 (delegations for the United States, Italy, and Monaco discussing the im-
portance of reciprocity in the form of respect for the Convention exhibited by the rebels);
id. at 90 (statement of Mr. Siordet of the ICRC confirming that the article intended to bind
insurgents). But see id. at 49-50 (delegations of Italy and Australia indicating their reser-
vations about incorporating a requirement for reciprocity into draft Article 2, paragraph 4,
which became Common Article 3).
142. GENEVA III COMMENTARY, supra note 71, at 32-33; see also 2 FINAL RECORD, su-
pra note 71, at 48, 99, 129, 330, 331, 333 (statements of the Soviet, Australian, Joint Com-
mittee, Burmese, Danish, and Venezuelan delegations indicating that these protections
were not applicable to mere bandits, partisans, or criminals).
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cited by the Court.' 43 Given the nature of al Qaeda, this is a point
that should have been examined.
Although the Court did not directly address it, the opinion does
give an indication of how the Court would likely have addressed
this question. In footnote 63, alongside the citations to the Com-
mon Article 3 Commentary and the aforementioned opinions es-
tablishing that the nature of the conflict is irrelevant, Justice Ste-
vens quotes the Commentary to Geneva Convention IV, which
states that "[niobody in enemy hands can be outside the law."'"
By itself this is a powerful statement, and an initial look at the
surrounding language found just before that quotation, which de-
clares that everyone must have a status under international law,
would seem to make the case even stronger that no one during
wartime falls outside the Geneva Conventions' basic protec-
tions.'45
Which of these concepts should prevail? Is it more important to
respect the idea that the Conventions' protections are earned and
therefore may be lost, a concept which I will refer to as account-
ability, 4 6 or to ensure that the Geneva Conventions' protections
are universal? The first step in making this determination must
be to compare statements like the one just quoted to the internal
logic of the Conventions as a whole. Although the Court only ad-
dressed Hamdan's right to Common Article 3 protections, it is
necessary to explore the Conventions as a whole to determine
whether the principle of universal application adopted by Justice
Stevens fits within that framework. After reviewing the state-
143. Text discouraging the application of the Geneva Conventions' protections to ter-
rorists and anarchists appears on pages thirty-two and thirty-three of the Commentary for
the Third Geneva Convention, whereas the Hamdan Court cited page thirty-five of the
same Commentary. GENEVA III COMMENTARY, supra note 71, at 32-33; see also Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2796 n.63.
144. Id. at 2796 n.63 (2006) (quoting GENEVA IV COMMENTARY, supra note 107, at 51).
145. See GENEVA IV COMMENTARY, supra note 107, at 51.
146. What I describe as accountability is in some ways similar to Derek Jinks's "sec-
ond-order reciprocity." See Derek Jinks, The Applicability of the Geneva Conventions to the
"Global War on Terrorism," 46 VA. J. INT'L L. 165, 193-95 (2005). Jinks finds that the Ge-
neva Conventions do not currently contain a requirement for "second-order reciprocity"
(i.e. the loss of protections based on a group's failure to observe the Conventions) and par-
tially bases this conclusion on the idea that the lack of enemy understanding of the legal
rewards and punishments prevents this from being a desirable enforcement mechanism.
See id. at 194. Contrasting this and leaving aside the often discussed use of "lawfare" by al
Qaeda and its co-sympathizers, which indicates that such an understanding may exist, my
conclusion is merely that accountability (or second-order reciprocity) was a driving consid-
eration of the Conventions' drafters, particularly in 1949.
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ments and logic of 1949, it will be necessary to do the same with
1977 to determine whether similar statements contained in the
Additional Protocols are binding explications of the Geneva Con-
ventions' scope or merely broad aspirational statements.
The Geneva IV Commentary indicates a belief that:
Every person in enemy hands must have some status under interna-
tional law: he is either a prisoner of war and, as such, covered by the
Third Convention, a civilian covered by the Fourth Convention, or
again, a member of the medical personnel of the armed forces who is
covered by the First Convention. 147
Taken by itself, this clearly contradicts the notion advanced by
the Geneva Convention III Commentary that Common Article 3's
protections are earned. 148 When viewed within the overall context
of the Geneva Conventions, however, it becomes apparent that
this description is oversimplified, and the broad conclusion that
"nobody in enemy hands can be outside the law" may be incorrect.
Geneva III specifically deals with prisoners of war ("POWs"),
and Article 4 of that Convention describes the requirements that
an individual must meet to be considered a prisoner of war.149
The relevant sections provide that:
A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are per-
sons belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen
into the power of the enemy:
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer
corps, including those of organized resistance movements,...
provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such
organized resistance movements, fulfil [sic] the following con-
ditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for
his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at
a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with
the laws and customs of war.
147. GENEVA TV COMMENTARY, supra note 107, at 51.
148. See supra pp. 707-08.
149. See GENEVA III COMMENTARY, supra note 71, at 49.
150. Geneva III, supra note 65, 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138.
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Much of the Article 4 Commentary concerns the extensive dis-
cussions between the contracting parties about the treatment of
partisans and other militias and resistance movements.15' The fi-
nal product allows for their treatment as POWs if they meet the
four requirements outlined in paragraph 2, the most important of
which requires that their organization conduct its operations "in
accordance with the laws and customs of war."15 2 The Commen-
tary describes this as "an essential provision" and specifically
states that compliance with subparagraph (d) means that "[t]hey
may not attack civilians or disarmed persons."153 This implies
that members of groups failing to meet these requirements would
not be entitled to treatment as POWs. The obvious question left
open by Article 4 is who decides?
This question is answered (perhaps unintentionally) by Article
5, paragraph 2, which provides the mechanism for determining
Article 4 status while adding a safeguard against arbitrary de-
terminations. 154 This paragraph requires that:
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed
a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, be-
long to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons
shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time
as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal. 155
Although Article 5 was mainly concerned with ensuring that
POWs received proper treatment from the moment they were
captured until their repatriation,1 6 and paragraph 2's predicted
purpose was to "apply to deserters, and to persons who accom-
pany the armed forces and have lost their identity card," 157 Arti-
cle 5 is generally viewed as providing the basis for some form of
initial status review. Once an Article 5 hearing determines that
the individual does not belong to any Article 4 category, however,
it would seem hard to argue that the Geneva Conventions expect
that the individual would continue to be treated as a POW.
If it is accepted that individuals can fail an Article 5 hearing
by, for example, belonging to a militia or organized resistance
151. See GENEVA III COMMENTARY, supra note 71, at 49-50, 52-61.
152. Geneva III, supra note 65, 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138.
153. GENEVA III COMMENTARY, supra note 71, at 61.
154. See id. at 77-78.
155. Geneva III, supra note 65, 6 U.S.T. at 3322-24, 75 U.N.T.S. at 140-42.
156. Id. 6 U.S.T. at 3322, 75 U.N.T.S. at 140.
157. GENEVA III COMMENTARY, supra note 71, at 77.
2008]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
movement that directly targets civilians, it becomes difficult to
credit the previously mentioned statement from the Geneva Con-
vention IV Commentary that every person must be either a POW
covered by the Third Convention, a civilian covered by the
Fourth, or a member of the medical personnel of the armed forces
covered by the First Convention.15 If that were the case, then a
militia or resistance movement engaging in belligerent acts that
place its members outside the category of people classified as
POWs actually benefits from this by having its members granted
the generally superior protections afforded civilians and medical
personnel by the Fourth and First Conventions, respectively. Al-
ternatively, organizations that routinely practice forbidden acts
such as targeting civilians could be discouraged from doing so by
not granting their members such status. Of these two choices, it
would seem reasonable to believe that the latter choice is more in
keeping with the overall purpose of the Conventions and the
shared expectations of the drafting parties in 1949.
The interpretation of the Geneva Conventions is not static,
however, and the mere fact that the 1949 statements of univer-
sality may not be squared with the internal logic of the 1949 Con-
ventions does not mean that such statements of universality are
not valid today. The other significant benchmark against which
such statements can be measured is the 1977 Additional Proto-
cols.
Additional Protocol I addresses POW status in Articles 43 and
44.159 These articles were designed to expand the categories of
POWs beyond those described in Article 4 of Geneva III and ex-
plicitly state that they may not be interpreted to prejudice the
right of anyone claiming POW status under Article 4.16° To this
end, they significantly relaxed the requirements for militias and
other irregular forces to qualify for POW status. 6' This change
was cited as a principle reason for the United States administra-
tion's recommendation against ratification.'62
158. See GENEVA IV COMMENTARY, supra note 107, at 51.
159. See Protocol I, supra note 67, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 23, 16 I.L.M. at 1410-11.
160. See id. 1125 U.N.T.S. at 23, 16 I.L.M. at 1411.
161. See Abraham D. Sofaer, The U.S. Decision not to Ratify Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions on the Protection of War Victims: The Rationale for the United States Deci-
sion, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 784, 785-86 (1988);
162. See id.; see also 1 ICRC TREATISE, supra note 108, at 388-89.
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Article 43 defines armed forces as:
[Aill organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a
command responsible to that Party for the conduct of its subordi-
nates, even if that Party is represented by a government or an au-
thority not recognized by an adverse Party. Such armed forces shall
be subject to an internal disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall
enforce compliance with the rules of international law applicable in
armed conflict. 163
It is important to understand that Article 43's focus is on the
organization and not the individual. The Commentary relating to
Article 43 makes clear that an individual does not lose his status
as a combatant, or his right to be treated as a POW, based on his
own actions, but rather his right to that status is inextricably
linked to the group that he belongs to and whether that group or
unit satisfies the terms of Article 43.164
Members of armed forces that satisfy this threshold definition
are then subject to the further requirements of Article 44, the pri-
mary purpose of which is to protect the civilian population by re-
quiring combatants to distinguish themselves from civilians.
165
Strikingly, the failure to meet those requirements may not result
in any change in status. 166 More importantly, even when an indi-
vidual's failure to comply with these standards results in a
163. Protocol I, supra note 67, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 23, 16 I.L.M. at 1410.
164. See CLAUDE PILLOUD ET AL., COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8
JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 513-14 (Yves Sandoz et
al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter PROTOCOL COMMENTARY].
165. See Protocol I, which provides:
In order to promote the protection of the civilian population from the ef-
fects of hostilities, combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the
civilian population while they are engaged in an attack or in a military opera-
tion preparatory to an attack. Recognizing, however, that there are situations
in armed conflicts where, owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed com-
batant cannot so distinguish himself, he shall retain his status as a combat-
ant, provided that, in such situations, he carries his arms openly:
(a) During each military engagement, and
(b) During such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is en-
gaged in a military deployment preceding the launching of an attack in
which he is to participate.
Protocol I, supra note 67, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 23, 16 I.L.M. at 1410-11.
166. Protocol I, Article 44, paragraph 2 provides:
While all combatants are obliged to comply with the rules of international
law applicable in armed conflict, violations of these rules shall not deprive a
combatant of his right to be a combatant or, if he falls into the power of an
adverse Party, of his right to be a prisoner of war, except as provided in para-
graphs 3 and 4.
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change of status, that change may not affect the individual's
treatment. 6 7 This clearly enunciated but rather jarring concept,
that the failure to comply with such an important requirement as
carrying arms openly in order to distinguish oneself from the ci-
vilian population can have no practical effect upon one's treat-
ment, supports the view that the latest version of the Geneva
Conventions may favor universality over creating behavioral in-
centives through accountability.
The debate between universality and behavioral accountability
is further complicated by the Commentary to Article 43. Within
the same paragraph, the Commentary confirms the unanimity
behind the essential requirement, that a group have an internal
disciplinary system to enforce compliance with international hu-
manitarian law, and states that members of an organization fail-
ing to comply with this requirement are to be treated as civil-
ians."' While the Commentary makes treatment as a civilian
seem disadvantageous because a civilian "can be punished for the
sole fact that he has taken up arms,"'69 a civilian is not subject to
detention merely because he belongs to a militia group until the
cessation of hostilities. Moreover, civilians are entitled to all the
procedural trial protections of the municipal criminal law system
and therefore must be freed if the evidentiary requirements or
procedural technicalities established by that system are not met.
Such an occurrence is likely to be relatively commonplace for in-
dividuals detained in a combat or near combat environment.
The underlying purpose of the Geneva Conventions is to pro-
tect basic human rights during wartime, even the rights of com-
167. Protocol I, paragraphs 4 and 5 state that:
4. A combatant who falls into the power of an adverse Party while failing to
meet the requirements set forth in the second sentence of paragraph 3 shall
forfeit his right to be a prisoner of war, but he shall, nevertheless, be given
protections equivalent in all respects to those accorded to prisoners of war by
the Third Convention and by this Protocol. This protection includes protec-
tions equivalent to those accorded to prisoners of war by the Third Conven-
tion in the case where such a person is tried and punished for any offences he
has committed.
5. Any combatant who falls into the power of an adverse Party while not en-
gaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack shall
not forfeit his rights to be a combatant and a prisoner of war by virtue of his
prior activities.
Id.
168. See PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 164, at 513-14.
169. See id. at 514.
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batants that do not comply with those Conventions. 17 0 However, it
is difficult to reconcile this purpose with the concept that a group
which targets civilians may benefit from that very behavior, by
being afforded all the rights of the civilians it targets. This is par-
ticularly true when such a group is contrasted with members of
armed forces that do respect Article 43's essential disciplinary re-
quirements and who are liable for detention until the cessation of
hostilities. These considerations make the question of which prin-
ciple should predominate, universality or accountability, a close
one, and one that the Court does not even address.
Because it is a close question, there is arguably justification
and support for both the principle of universality and the Court's
decision to extend Common Article 3 protections to an individual
that has failed an Article 5 hearing. Therefore, although not
based on an investigation or even an apparent recognition of the
two alternatives, Justice Stevens's decision to choose universality
of application over accountability is defensible, yet clearly not
mandated by the broader goals of the Geneva Conventions and
their Additional Protocols.
While this analysis concludes that the Court's decision regard-
ing the scope of Common Article 3 may be correct, it does not
mean that the Court's lack of analysis did not come at a price.
Once it is determined that Common Article 3's protections are to
be provided, the analysis just completed should inform the expan-
siveness with which those protections are read. If universality
were the sole illuminating principle of the Geneva Conventions,
then an expansive reading of the protections might be appropri-
ate. But where, as here, the principles of universality and ac-
countability are in tension, a less expansive reading is called for
because expansiveness comes at a price to accountability.
How then should we view Justice Stevens's substantive conclu-
sions concerning regularly constituted courts and judicial guaran-
tees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized people?
A. Regularly Constituted Courts
Justice Stevens viewed the requirements for regularly consti-
tuted courts and judicial guarantees as separate but intertwined
170. See Protocol I, supra note 67, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 23, 16 I.L.M. at 1410-11.
2008]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
concepts. 71 He first determined that the military commissions
are not regularly constituted based on the definition in the Ge-
neva IV Commentary, Article 66, and a 2005 ICRC Treatise.'72
Justice Stevens then separately considered whether the military
commissions offer the necessary judicial guarantees.'73 A closer
look at these sources and the Commentary for Common Article 3
calls into question both the view that these are two separate re-
quirements and the expansiveness with which these protections
are read.
Common Article 3's Commentary contains only one reference to
the protections provided by paragraph 1(d).174 While Justice Alito
in his dissent cited this reference,' 75 the majority did not consider
it. 7 6 The Commentary recognizes the importance of "safeguards
aimed at eliminating the possibility of judicial errors," and clari-
fies this requirement by stating that "[w]e must be very clear
about one point; it is only 'summary' justice which it is intended
to prohibit."'77 This clarification, coupled with the plain language
of Common Article 3's other protections, should serve as a guide
to how broadly those protections ought to be read. Common Arti-
cle 3's subparagraphs (a) through (c) prohibit murder, mutilation
and torture, the taking of hostages, and humiliating and degrad-
ing treatment. 17' Reading subparagraph (d) to prohibit "summary
justice" is consonant with the other protections afforded by the
Article. The Court's more expansive reading of subparagraph (d),
to prohibit convictions without the full disclosure of all sources
and methods used to collect classified evidence against the defen-
dant, seems less so. This reading is all the more troubling in light
of the significant tension between universality and accountabil-
ity, 179 and the subsequent loss of accountability to which such an
expansive reading will lead.
171. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2796-98 (2006).
172. See id. at 2796-97.
173. See id. at 2797-98.
174. GENEVA III COMMENTARY, supra note 71, at 39-40.
175. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2854 (Alito, J., dissenting).
176. See generally id. at 2757-98 (majority opinion) (failing to cite Common Article 3's
Commentary).
177. GENEVA III COMMENTARY, supra note 71, at 40.
178. Geneva I, supra note 65, 6 U.S.T. at 3116-18, 75 U.N.T.S. at 32-34; Geneva II,
supra note 65, 6 U.T.S. at 3222, 75 U.N.T.S. at 88; Geneva III, supra note 65, 6 U.N.T.S.
at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138; Geneva IV, supra note 65, 6 U.S.T. at 3520, 75 U.N.T.S. at
290.
179. See supra Part IV.
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Rather than focusing on the language of Common Article 3 and
its Commentary, however, Justice Stevens turned to Geneva IV,
specifically Article 66,8 ° which addresses the requirements for
the trial of civilians who are accused of violating ordinances es-
tablished by an occupying power. 18 ' The purpose of Article 66 is to
reinforce the legislative powers of the occupying forces "by judi-
cial powers designed to make good the deficiencies of the local
courts, should this be necessary.' '8 2 It allows for the use of mili-
tary courts as long as those courts sit within the occupied terri-
tory. 13 While the Commentary does state that the courts must be
regularly constituted and that "[iit is the ordinary military courts
of the Occupying Power which will be competent,"'8'4 the applica-
tion of this definition to the composition of war crimes tribunals
seems misplaced.
This sense that the definition is misapplied is supported by the
ICRC Treatise. Customary International Humanitarian Law is a
two volume treatise produced by the ICRC that gathers relevant
treaties, state practice, national legislation, national and interna-
tional judicial decisions, and the practice of international organi-
zations to define the contours of customary international law.'
Among the three stated purposes for its production is to "help in
the interpretation of treaty law."188 While this treatise has been
criticized, the criticism has primarily been that it takes an overly
expansive view of customary international law, rather than that
it is overly restrictive.' 7 Justice Stevens relied on the Treatise's
statement that a regularly constituted court with respect to
Common Article 3 is a court 'established and organized in accor-
dance with the laws and procedures already in force in a coun-
try."' 8 8 He did not look beyond this statement.
180. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2797.
181. Geneva IV, supra note 65, 6 U.S.T. at 3558-60, 75 U.N.T.S. 328-30; see GENEVA
IV COMMENTARY, supra note 107, AT 339-40.
182. GENEVA IV COMMENTARY, supra note 107, at 340.
183. Geneva IV, supra note 65, 6 U.S.T. 3558-60, 75 U.N.T.S. at 328-30.
184. GENEVA IV COMMENTARY, supra note 107, at 340.
185. See generally 1-2 ICRC TREATISE, supra note 108.
186. See Jakob Kellenberger, Foreword to 1 ICRC TREATISE, supra note 108, at ix-x.
187. See Letter from John Bellinger III, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, and Jim
Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Def., to Dr. Jakob Kellenberger, President, Int'l
Comm. of the Red Cross (Nov. 3, 2006), available at http://www.state.gov/s/lUrls/82630.htm.
188. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2797 (quoting 1 ICRC TREATISE, supra note
108, at 355). The Government asserts that military commissions are established and or-
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The ICRC Treatise does not contain separate sections for "regu-
larly constituted courts" and "essential judicial guarantees." The
sentence Justice Stevens quoted is found in a section entitled
"Definition of a fair trial affording all essential judicial guaran-
tees," the primary focus of which is on the right to be tried by an
independent and impartial tribunal." 9 A review of the sources re-
lied upon by the ICRC is telling. The military manuals of eleven
nations were reviewed and ten of the eleven specifically mention
the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality, while
only two mention the term regularly constituted court.1 90 Like-
wise, a review of national legislation indicates an overwhelming
concern with the tribunal's independence and impartiality and
the relative lack of concern with the procedures surrounding the
tribunal's creation.191 Lastly, other international or regional hu-
man rights covenants also focus on the requirements of independ-
ence and impartiality without reference to the mechanical re-
quirements of a regularly constituted court. 192
The ICRC Treatise discusses the requirement for independence
and impartiality and describes the test for these attributes.'93 In-
dependence is determined by the relationship between the judici-
ary and the other branches of government, especially the execu-
tive.' 94 Impartiality is viewed from both a subjective viewpoint,
that the judge must be free from preconceptions about the matter
ganized in accordance with laws and procedures already in force in this country, specifi-
cally referencing 10 U.S.C. § 821, which allows for the use of military commissions to try
offenses against the law of war. See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 111, at 17-18,
49-50.
189. See 1 ICRC TREATISE, supra note 108, at 354-57.
190. See 2 ICRC TREATISE, supra note 108, at 2404-06 (explaining that the manuals of
Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, the United
Kingdom, and the United States all mention the guarantees of independence and imparti-
ality, and the Swiss manual describes the guarantees of "an impartial and regularly con-
stituted tribunal").
191. See id. at 2406-07 (reviewing the national legislation in the Czech Republic, Geor-
gia, Germany, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, and Slovakia, which all reference
the essential guarantees of a court's independence and/or impartiality; with only legisla-
tion in Germany and the Netherlands referencing regularly constituted courts, and the
Dutch reference is a quote from Common Article 3.)
192. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14, Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 176-77, 6 I.L.M. 368, 372-73 (1967).
193. 1 ICRC TREATISE, supra note 108, at 354-57.
194. Id. at 356.
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before him, and the objective viewpoint, that there may be no le-
gitimate doubt about its impartiality. 195
While Justice Stevens did not address this broad international
emphasis on independence and impartiality, Justice Kennedy in
his concurrence more fully defined the term regularly constituted
court in a manner that purportedly accounts for this requirement.
Justice Kennedy found that the term regularly constituted court
requires the use of regular court-martial procedures unless there
is a practical legislative or executive explanation for deviating
from them.1 96 He expressed three main concerns over the military
commission's deviations from regular court-martial procedure.
First, that the presiding officer is a judge advocate rather than a
military judge; second, that interlocutory questions are certified
to the convening authority instead of to the Court of Criminal
Appeals; and lastly, that the current process allows for as few as
three members on a military commission whereas the regular
court-martial procedures mandate five members.1 97
The first and third of these concerns do not call into question
the independence and impartiality of the commission. The only
qualitative difference between a judge and a judge advocate is
that the former has completed a three week certification course at
the Judge Advocate General school, which would have little if any
impact on independence and impartiality.198 Likewise, there is no
significant difference between a military commission with a panel
of three members and one of five. While a smaller panel might
"affect the deliberative process, ' it seems unlikely to affect its
independence and impartiality. The true focus of Justice Ken-
nedy's concern appears to be the difference in the appointing au-
thority.2"' While regular courts-martial are appointed by the
Judge Advocate General (and certified questions go to the Court
of Criminal Appeals that is also appointed by the Judge Advocate
195. See id.
196. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2804 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
197. See id. at 2805-06.
198. Telephone Interview with Major Sean Watts, Judge Advocate General's School, in
Charlottesville, Virginia. (Mar. 8, 2007).
199. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2806 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
200. See id. at 2805-06.
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General), the appointing authority for the military commissions is
the Secretary of Defense.20'
It is unusual, and somewhat ironic, for a military tribunal's in-
dependence to be questioned because it is subject to a greater de-
gree of civilian oversight. The ICRC Treatise cites numerous ex-
amples questioning the independence of military tribunals.2 2 The
main basis for questioning these tribunals' independence is a con-
cern about an insufficient separation between the executive and
judicial functions.20 3 While there can be no question that military
commissions convened by the Secretary of Defense might be criti-
cized for a lack of such separation, it is hard to see how this is
materially different from commissions convened by a service
Judge Advocate General. Service Judge Advocate Generals are
appointed by the Secretary of Defense or his subordinates. 24 Jus-
tice Kennedy thus found that trials convened under the UCMJ by
a service Judge Advocate General whose interlocutory appeals
are heard by the Court of Criminal Appeals, also appointed by a
service Judge Advocate General, are sufficiently independent and
impartial.2 5 In contrast, trials convened by an appointee of the
Secretary of Defense which utilize military judges and lawyers
and refer interlocutory appeals to the same convening authority,
are not sufficiently independent and impartial. 
2 06
As the ICRC Treatise and Justice Kennedy indicate, the true
touchstone of regularly constituted courts is independence and
impartiality, not a mechanical requirement related to the court's
creation. Where international law is concerned, this goal of inde-
pendence and impartiality is generally enhanced by increased ci-
vilian oversight of military tribunals. Whatever political misgiv-
ings one might have had about the quality of the civilian
oversight that existed when the Hamdan decision was passed
down, the Court's opinion insulating future military tribunals
from aspects of that oversight may ultimately be viewed as un-
dermining those goals.
201. See id.
202. See 2 ICRC TREATISE, supra note 108, at 2408-15 (citing mostly situations that
occur in African nations in which the military's compliance with civilian oversight is far
from well established).
203. See id.
204. Telephone Interview with Major Sean Watts, supra note 198.
205. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2806 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
206. See id. at 2806-07.
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B. Indispensable Judicial Guarantees
Justice Stevens's plurality opinion determines that Common
Article 3's requirement that tribunals provide "judicial guaran-
tees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples" is
designed to incorporate the "barest of those trial protections that
have been recognized by customary international law."" 7 He
found that these barest of protections are enumerated in Article
75 of Protocol I and that the military commissions fail to provide
these protections.0 8 An examination of both the text and scope of
the Additional Protocols calls this conclusion into question.
Protocol I explicitly applies to Common Article 2 conflicts and
therefore should not apply to the conflict in Hamdan .209 While
Justice Stevens rightly pointed out that Article 75 of Protocol I is
recognized as customary international law,210 that recognition
does not expand Protocol I's scope beyond Common Article 2 con-
flicts. Customary international law may allow the substantive
provisions of international treaties to mature, but it should not
affect their scope or triggering mechanisms. This is particularly
true when Article 75's explicit reference to Protocol I's scope is
considered.211
If there were no alternative enumerations of indispensable ju-
dicial guarantees available, then turning to Article 75 of Protocol
I might have some merit. It could be argued that although on its
face these protections are only applicable to Common Article 2 de-
fendants, the international consensus surrounding these guaran-
tees is sufficient to extend them to Common Article 3 defendants
as well. This reasoning cannot be applied to Hamdan because an
explicit enumeration of judicial guarantees applicable to Common
Article 3 defendants has already been created by Protocol II.
207. Id. at 2797.
208. See id. at 2797-98.
209. See Protocol I, supra note 67, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 7, 16 I.L.M. at 1397 (providing that
"[t]his Protocol, which supplements the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the
protection of war victims, shall apply in the situations referred to in Article 2 common to
those Conventions.").
210. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2797-98.
211. See Protocol I, supra note 67, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 37, 16 I.L.M. at 1423 (stating that
Article 75 applies to persons "[iun so far as they are affected by a situation referred to in
Article 1 of this Protocol").
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Protocol II explicitly covers Common Article 3 conflicts, and it
defines its scope as covering all armed conflicts not covered by
Protocol I.212 Not only does it amplify the very protections that
the Court has indicated are involved in this case, but Article 6 of
Protocol II and Article 75 of Protocol I actually enumerate the ju-
dicial guarantees provided by Common Article 3 in an almost
identical manner.213 It is striking that Protocol II was not dis-
cussed in the Hamdan opinion or by many commentators since
then.214 It is particularly surprising that this conflation of the
laws governing international and non-international armed con-
flicts has been largely ignored when the existence of a meaningful
distinction between these types of conflicts has been so often reaf-
firmed.215
The impetus for the 1977 Additional Protocols can be traced
back twenty years to the 1957 ICRC Conference in New Delhi,
when the ICRC submitted draft rules from that conference to na-
tional governments.1 6 After the national governments ignored
this overture, the ICRC created a second draft proposal that was
amended by the Conference of Government Experts in June
212. Article 1 of Protocol II states that Protocol II
develops and supplements Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949 without modifying its existing conditions of application, [and it]
shall apply to all armed conflicts which are not covered by Article 1 of the
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relat-
ing to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I).
Protocol II, supra note 67, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 611, 16 I.L.M. at 1443.
213. Compare Protocol II, supra note 67, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 613, 16 I.L.M. at 1445-46,
with Protocol I, supra note 67, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 37-38, 16 I.L.M. at 1423-24.
214. But see Corn, supra note 69, at 875-79; Corn, supra note 70, at 1. These in depth
treatments of Protocol II in the Hamdan context dismiss the differences between the pro-
tections enumerated by Protocol I and Protocol II, and instead find that they are both sup-
portive of the greater goal of impartiality.
215. See, e.g., Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 184-85 (2007) (finding that interna-
tional law does not recognize "enemy combatants" in non-international armed conflicts);
Jack Beard, The Geneva Boomerang: The Military Commissions Act of 2006 and U.S.
Counterterrorist Operations, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 56, 63-64 (2007) (criticizing the Military
Commissions Act for conflating the rules governing international and non-international
armed conflicts); Hans-Peter Gasser, The U.S. Decision Not to Ratify Protocol I to the Ge-
neva Conventions on the Protection of War Victims, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 910, 919 (1987) (urg-
ing the United States ratification of Protocol I based in part on the fact that Protocol I "has
nothing to say about noninternational armed conflicts"); Alec Walen & Ingo Venzke, Un-
constitutional Detention of Nonresident Aliens: Revisiting the Supreme Court's Treatment
of the Law of War in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 15-24 (Apr. 10, 2007), available at SSRN:
http://works.bepress.com/alecwalen/l/ (discussing the difference in determination of com-
batant status in international and non-international armed conflicts).
216. See 1 HOWARD S. LEVIE, PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS: PROTOCOL 1 TO THE 1949
GENEVA CONVENTIONS xiii (1979) [hereinafter WAR VICTIMS].
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1973.217 It was this draft that the Diplomatic Conference on the
Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian
Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts began considering in 1974.218
Approximately 125 nations were represented when the conference
opened.219 Four sessions, lasting between two and three months
each, were convened over the next four years during which both
Protocols were debated, discussed, and extensively revised.
220
Concerns about Protocol II's application to internal conflicts
and its potential interference with state sovereignty resulted in
sweeping changes to that Protocol.2 21 While some nations favored
equating participants in international conflicts with those in-
volved in internal struggles, others adamantly opposed such
equality. 2 2 An exchange during the second session in 1975 is il-
lustrative of these divisions. During a committee meeting on the
scope of draft Article 10 (the article which would ultimately be-
come Article 6 that enumerates the judicial guarantees at issue in
Hamdan), the Swedish delegation stated that combatants cap-
tured during internal conflicts "should be placed on a more equal
footing with prisoners of war in international conflicts."223 The
Canadian delegation proposed a redraft of the entire Protocol. In
the explanatory notes accompanying this proposal, the Canadians
cited their opposition to this concept as one of the four principal
reasons for overhauling the Protocol.224 Canada felt that, "Noth-
ing in the Protocol should suggest that dissidents must be treated
legally other than as rebels. To move in the direction of recogniz-
ing the military activities of the rebels as having some degree of
legitimacy, is to invite the expectation or even demand for Pris-
oner-of-War status on capture. 225
217. See id.
218. See id. at xiii-xiv.
219. Id. at xiv.
220. See id. Neither of the relevant articles retained their initial numbering. Article 75
of Protocol I was initially designated Article 65 of the draft protocols and it retained this
number throughout the drafting and discussion sessions. Similarly Article 6 of Protocol II
resulted from the combination of draft Articles 9 and 10. The new designation as Article 6
did not occur until the simplified version of Protocol II was adopted in 1977.
221. See THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT: PROTOCOL II TO THE 1949
GENEVA CONVENTIONS 3-8 (Howard S. Levie ed., 1987) [hereinafter LEVIE PROTOCOL III.
222. See id. at 3 (referencing criticism of Draft Protocol II).
223. Id. at 257.
224. See id. at x-xi, 9.
225. Id. at 9 (explanatory comments of Canadian delegation of April 4, 1975).
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After four years of discussion and amendments, the deep divi-
sion over this issue threatened to block Protocol II entirely. 226 Led
in part by Pakistan, a number of delegations supported a simpli-
fied draft of Protocol 11.227 This simplified draft was adopted in
1977, leaving only eighteen of the original thirty-nine substantive
articles intact.228 Any examination of the judicial guarantees af-
forded to Common Article 3 defendants should be undertaken
with these underlying concerns in mind.
The enumerated judicial guarantees described in the two Pro-
tocols are found in paragraph 4 of Article 75 in Protocol 1229 and
in paragraph 2 of Article 6 in Protocol J1.23' A careful comparison
of the two articles reveals very few differences. The introductory
paragraphs are similar. Paragraph 4 of Article 75 states that the
offence must be "related to the armed conflict" and it requires an
"impartial and regularly constituted court."231 Paragraph 2 of Ar-
ticle 6 does not explicitly require a relationship between the of-
fence and the armed conflict and it does not use the term regu-
226. See id. at 3-4.
227. See id.
228. See id. at x.
229. Protocol I, supra note 67, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 37-38, 16 I.L.M. at 1424.
230. Paragraph 2 of Article 6 in Protocol II provides:
No sentence shall be passed and no penalty shall be executed on a person
found guilty of an offence except pursuant to a conviction pronounced by a
court offering the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality. In
particular:
(a) The procedure shall provide for an accused to be informed without
delay of the particulars of the offence alleged against him and shall af-
ford the accused before and during his trial all necessary rights and
means of defence;
(b) No one shall be convicted of an offence except on the basis of indi-
vidual penal responsibility;
(c) No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any
act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under the
law, at the time when it was committed; nor shall a heavier penalty be
imposed than that which was applicable at the time when the criminal
offence was [committed] if, after the commission of the offence, provi-
sion is made by law for the imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender
shall benefit thereby;
(d) Anyone charged with an offence is presumed innocent until proved
guilty according to law;
(e) Anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to be tried in
his presence;
(f) No one shall be compelled to testify against himself or to confess
guilt.
Protocol II, supra note 67, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 613-14, 16 I.L.M. at 1445-46.
231. Protocol I, supra note 67, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 37, 16 I.L.M. at'1424.
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larly constituted court but instead requires that the court offer
"the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality."
23 2
This phrasing further supports the argument made in Part IV.A
that Common Article 3's requirement of a regularly constituted
court is more directed towards the substantive protections pro-
vided (independence, impartiality, and enumerated procedural
guarantees) than to the mechanics underlying the court's crea-
tion.
2 33
The principal difference between the subparagraphs is simply
their number. Article 75, paragraph 4 contains ten subpara-
graphs (a) through (), 234 while Article 6, paragraph 2 has only
six, (a) through (f).235 All but one of the common subparagraphs
are identical and the differences between the two subparagraph
(c)'s are superficial. 236 The additional guarantees provided for in
Article 75 that are not provided for in Article 6 can be summa-
rized as cross-examination and calling witnesses subparagraph
(g), double jeopardy subparagraph (h), the public pronouncement
of the judgment subparagraph (i), and notification of appellate
rights subparagraph (j).2 37 While nothing in the negotiating histo-
ries of these articles specifically addresses why these guarantees
were included in Protocol I and not in Protocol II, it is clear that
both committees extensively shared drafts throughout the proc-
ess. 18 In fact, Committee Three of the Protocol I Working Group
reported that the judicial guarantees enumerated in Protocol I
were modeled after those found in Protocol II before it added the
last four guarantees. 239 Given this close interaction between the
232. Protocol II, supra note 67, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 613, 16 I.L.M. at 1445-46; 1 ICRC
TREATISE, supra note 108, at 354-55.
233. See supra Part IV.A.
234. Protocol I, supra note 67, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 37-38, 16 I.L.M. at 1423-24.
235. Protocol II, supra note 67, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 613-14, 16 I.L.M. at 1445-46.
236. Compare Protocol I, supra note 67, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 37-38, 16 I.L.M. at 1424,
with Protocol II, supra note 67, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 613-14, 16 I.L.M. at 1445-46. Article 6,
paragraph 2(c) states that no one may be "held guilty" of an offence, while Article 75 para-
graph 4(c) provides that no one may be "accused or convicted" of an offence. Also, Article
75, paragraph 4(c) uses the phrase "under the national or international law to which he
was subject," which Article 6, paragraph 2(c) replaces with simply "under the law." Proto-
col I, supra note 67, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 37-38, 16 I.L.M. at 1424; Protocol II, supra note 67,
1125 U.N.T.S. at 613-14, 16 I.L.M. at 1445.
237. See Protocol I, supra note 67, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 38, 16 I.L.M. at 1424.
238. See LEVIE PROTOCOL II, supra note 221, at 249-55 (Brazilian, Italian, Polish and
New Zealand delegations urging that a portion of draft Article 9 of Protocol II be aligned
with draft Article 65 of Protocol I).
239. See 4 WAR VICTIMS, supra note 216, at 63-64.
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drafting committees, and thewidely held sense that there was to
be some difference between the rules governing international and
non-international conflicts, it is reasonable to infer that the dif-
ferences between the judicial guarantees enumerated by Article
75 of Protocol I and those enumerated by Article 6 of Protocol II
were intentional.
This difference between the guarantees enumerated by Proto-
col I and those enumerated by Protocol II should have affected
the plurality's opinion on the protections afforded Common Arti-
cle 3 defendants. While Justice Stevens only specifically ad-
dressed paragraph 4(e) of Article 75 (the right to be tried "in his
presence" that is found in both Protocols),24 ° the basis for his find-
ing that the military commissions fall short of this requirement
implicate more than just that requirement. Justice Stevens fo-
cused on the fact that "information used to convict a person of a
crime must be disclosed to him."241 This access-to-evidence re-
quirement goes beyond mere presence at trial, and is more fairly
encompassed by the right to cross examine witnesses to ascertain
the basis for their evidence. That right is guaranteed by para-
graph 4(g) of Protocol I, Article 75, but is not protected by Article
6 of Protocol 11.242
In addition to citing a litany of cases that confirm the common
law right to cross examine witnesses (which is somewhat irrele-
vant to an international law analysis), Justice Stevens cited two
international bases for finding that Hamdan must be afforded the
right to examine the witnesses and evidence against him.243 He
first cited an article by William H. Taft, the legal advisor to the
State Department, to assert the proposition that the United
States regards Article 75's protections as applying to "all persons
in the hands of an enemy. 2 44 While arguably persuasive for that
proposition, another Taft statement was cited for a different
proposition-that Hamdan was entitled to Common Article 2 pro-
tections. 245 Hamdan's brief quoted Taft as saying that the Geneva
240. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2797 (2006).
241. Id. at 2798 (mentioning the necessity for access to evidence twice on one page).
242. Compare Protocol I, supra note 67, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 38, 16 I.L.M. at 1424, with
Protocol II, supra note 67, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 613-14, 16 I.L.M. at 1445-46.
243. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2797-98 n.66.
244. Id. at 2797 (quoting William H. Taft, IV, The Law of Armed Conflict After 9/11:
Some Salient Features, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 319, 322 (2003)).
245. See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 111, at 46 (citing memorandum from Wil-
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Conventions do not recognize a distinction between the conflict
with the Taliban and the conflict with al Qaeda.246 Considering
the Government's recognition that the Geneva Conventions cover
the Taliban conflict, if Taft's statement carried sufficient weight
to bind the Government, Hamdan would be entitled to Common
Article 2 protections. Yet, Justice Stevens did not agree. It would
be incongruous, then, to find Taft's opinion sufficient to expand
Article 75 of Protocol I protections to Common Article 3 defen-
dants.
The second international basis for Justice Stevens's conclusions
involves the Allied war crimes trials of Japanese defendants after
World War II. In footnote 66, Justice Stevens mentioned two tri-
als where Japanese defendants were convicted by Allied war
crimes tribunals for, among other things, conducting summary
trials that failed to "apprise accused individuals of all evidence
against them."247 Once one reads the summaries of these trials
cited by Justice Stevens, the comparison can only be described as
shocking.
In one case, Sergeant-Major Shigeru Ohashi was convicted of
the summary beheading of eighteen civilians that the Japanese
charged with sabotage.248 Including the ten minutes of delibera-
tions, their collective trial lasted for approximately fifty min-
utes.249 The accused were not provided with defense counsel and
the beheadings began one hour after the termination of the
trial. 250 Further, Ohashi's trial did not involve any claim by the
defense that the eighteen victims were ever denied access to evi-
dence against them.251
In the other case, General Tanaka Hisakasu was convicted of
authorizing the trial and execution of Major Houck of the United
States Army Air Force.25 2 Major Houck was shot down over Hong
liam H. Taft, IV, to Counsel to the President J 3 (Feb. 2, 2002), available at http://www.
fas.org/sgp/othergov/taft.pdf).
246. See id.
247. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2797 n.66.
248. See Trial of Sergeant-Major Shigeru Ohashi and Six Others, 5 Law Reports of Tri-
als of War Criminals 25, 25 (1946).
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. See id. at 28.
252. See Trial of General Tanaka Hisakasu and Five Others, 5 Law Reports of Trials of
War Criminals 66, 66-67 (1946).
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Kong while attacking Japanese naval forces in the harbor.2 3 Ma-
jor Houck was accused of bombing and intentionally destroying a
civilian vessel as well as killing eight civilians.254 The Major was
not provided with defense counsel, was tried in less than two
hours, sentenced to death, and executed the next day.255 In its list
of four factors that the military commission considered illustra-
tive of the illegal nature of this trial, there was no mention of the
withholding of evidence from Major Houck's inspection.256 In fact,
the summary of Major Houck's trial provided by the war crimes
tribunal indicates that Major Houck was given access to the re-
ports (written in Japanese) prepared for his prosecution by both
the Japanese military authorities and the Hong Kong police.257
Justice Stevens used these two examples to support his holding
that a defendant is personally entitled to examine all classified
evidence against him in an unfiltered form. 25" This borders on the
ridiculous. The military commissions that were struck down by
the Hamdan court not only provided the defendant with counsel,
but required that his counsel be given access to all evidence prof-
fered against him.2 59 The only grounds for withholding unfiltered
evidence from the accused would be for the protection of wit-
nesses or for national security interests threatened by the revela-
tion of classified means and methods of intelligence collection.26 °
Even if Justice Stevens's only point was to cite the fact that Allied
war crimes prosecutors mentioned the right of access to evidence
in passing, comparisons between these summary executions and
the military commissions at issue do not lead to the conclusion
reached by Justice Stevens.
253. Id. at 66.
254. See id. at 67.
255. See id. at 67-69.
256. See id. at 70-71. The Commission convicting General Hisakasu cited the following
four factors in support of its opinion: (1) lack of defense counsel, (2) no opportunity to pre-
pare a defense or secure evidence on his own behalf, (3) no witnesses were allowed to ap-
pear and the Tribunal ignored Houck's evidence concerning the intent of his attack, (4) the
brevity of the proceedings. See id.
257. See id. at 67.
258. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2797 & n.66, 2798.
259. See U.S. Dep't of Def., Military Comm'n Order No. 1, §§ 5(D)-(E), 6(B)(3) (Mar. 21,
2002), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d2002O321ord.pdf (requiring
that defense counsel is made available to the accused, evidence to be presented by the
prosecution is provided to the defense counsel, and any information withheld from the ac-
cused is made available to the appointed defense counsel).
260. See id. § 6(B)(3).
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In summary, the Hamdan Court ignored the protections explic-
itly provided for Common Article 3 defendants by Protocol II. In-
stead, the Court relied upon customary international law to ex-
tend the Article 75 protections to Common Article 3 defendants.
This runs contrary to Article 75 itself and to the Additional Pro-
tocols as a whole. A careful examination of the Protocols and their
drafting history indicates that the shared expectation of the par-
ties was that Common Article 3 defendants, like Hamdan, are en-
titled to the more basic protections of Protocol II and not the full
protections of Protocol I.
V. CONCLUSION
Far from the victory for international law that many have pro-
claimed it, the Court's treatment of the international law issues
in Hamdan can more appropriately be seen as a missed opportu-
nity. Although the issues concerning the scope and substance of
Common Article 3 rights were not extensively briefed, the Su-
preme Court's own principles of treaty interpretation required it
to seek the "shared expectations of the contracting parties."261 Lit-
tle effort was made to determine that expectation in this context,
which resulted in a cursory examination of three close and sub-
stantively significant issues presented by the Geneva Conven-
tions.262 That these issues, involving the treatment of detainees
charged with war crimes in the global war on terror, are of par-
ticular importance in today's international environment makes
the inattention all the more baffling.
By deviating from its typically thorough approach in this area,
the Court failed to address important considerations underlying
the scope of Common Article 3's protections, particularly the ten-
sion between behavioral accountability and universal application.
It also based its analysis of Common Article 3's substantive pro-
tections on the concept that customary international law could
expand the reach of Protocol I's protections beyond the bounda-
ries that Protocol I's drafters established.263 This was done in
spite of Protocol II's clear applicability to this case. Finally, the
261. Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 399 (1985); see supra note 31 and accompanying
text.
262. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2793-98 (2006).
263. See id. at 2797-98.
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Court's use of inflammatory comparisons between World War II
summary executions and the procedural protections offered by
the military commissions 264 reflected little credit on its analysis
while potentially inviting the heavy-handed legislative response
that followed. 265
264. Id. at 2797 n. 66.
265. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (to
be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 note).
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